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Is the United States Bound by the Customary
International Law of Torture?

A Proposal for ATS Litigation in the War on Terror
Joshua A. Decker*

"Regardless of its substance, however, customary international law cannot
bind the executive branch under the Constitution because it is not federal law."'
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were a seminal moment for the
United States. This horrific act of murder and destruction inspired the United
States to declare "war on terror, ' 2 a war unlike any other in American history.
For the first time, the United States is at war with international non-state
actors-terrorist groups-not supported by specific nation-states; all previous
wars have been against international sovereigns. Moreover, the War on Terror is
not limited to a discrete set of enemies but extends to the concept of "terror"the use of force and fear against civilians to achieve political ends.
Though this war is unique, some consequences of its prosecution are
similar to previous wars. Like the atrocities of Vietnam, US actors have allegedly
committed acts of abuse. Numerous organizations have accused US agents of
abusing and torturing unlawful combatants detained at the US Naval Station at
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Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ("Guantanamo" or "GTMO") and military bases in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
Unlike in other wars, the President has determined that the entire set of the
Geneva Conventions' and customary international law's humanitarian guarantees
does not apply to all enemy combatants. Specifically, the unlawful combatants of
al Qaeda and the Taliban are denied the entire suite of international
humanitarian law's protections.3
Can the Administration legally do this? The legal arguments for excluding
the Geneva Conventions' protections are sound; for example, "al Qaeda is not a
High Contracting Party to Geneva." 4 The United States can conceivably avoid
such treaty obligations, but most of customary international law's humanitarian
protections arejus cogens, that is, states cannot lawfully derogate from them.
The United States allegedly tortured War on Terror detainees. Does this
violate the customary international law of torture or did President Bush's
determination exempt the United States from its obligations? Is there enough
evidence to reasonably suggest that the United States engaged in torture? As a
policy matter, should the international norm against torture bind the United
States?
A few words are needed at the outset. Many scholars have discussed the
binding authority of customary international law, but there has yet to be a
thorough exegesis of the anti-torture norm in the specific context of War on
Terror detainees. The Administration has asserted that the United States is not
domestically bound by customary international law.' This Comment tests that
proposition against the customary international law of torture.
Because I attempt to address the Administration's claim on its own
terms-that al Qaeda and the Taliban are excluded from some customary
humanitarian rights-I will only address the alleged torture of al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees. Though the atrocities at Abu Ghralb are perhaps the most
infamous example of US abuse,6 those Iraqi detainees were arguably covered by
the Geneva Conventions. At the very least, President Bush did not determine

3

Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to the Vice President, et al,
Humane Treatment of alQaedaand Taliban Detainees (Feb 7, 2002) (hereinafter Memorandum from
President Bush) (on file with author).

4

Id at

5

Yoo and Delahunty Memorandum at 34 (cited in note 1).
See Seymour M. Hersh, Torture atAbu Ghraib, New Yorker 42 (May 10, 2004).
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that the Iraqi detainees, like al Qaeda and the Taliban, were excluded from
international humanitarian law.
This inquiry proceeds in three parts. First, I determine whether the United
States tortured War on Terror detainees. I then consider whether a binding
international norm against torture exists and if the United States violated it.
Finally, I examine this issue from a policy standpoint, asking whether it is good
policy to have the customary international law of torture bind the United States.
I. ACTS OF TORTURE
The first issue to consider is whether the United States actually tortured
detainees. There is considerable evidence to suggest that US agents engaged in
morally questionable, abusive behavior. This evidence comes from three sources:
the detainees themselves, the International Committee of the Red Cross
("ICRC" or "Red Cross"), and "pro-US" sources such as US agents.8 I will
address each in turn.
A. DETAINEE REPORTS
This Section examines the detainees' allegations by looking to lawsuits they
filed and their interviews with third parties. In considering their claims, one must
retain a healthy dose of skepticism because the detainees are interested parties
whose reports may be tainted by self-serving bias.
1. Lawsuits
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") has filed a lawsuit against
US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld on behalf of detainees who were
allegedly held and abused in Afghanistan and Iraq.9 The four Afghanistan
detainees-Mehboob Ahmad, Said Nabi Siddiqi, Mohammed Karim Shirullah,
and Haji Abdul Rahman-assert claims of torture that are brutal in their honesty
and shocking in their detail.

7

See John C. Yoo, The Status of Soldiers and Terroristsunder the Geneva Conventions, 3 Chinese J Ind L

8

135, 135 (2004) (noting that "it has been U.S. policy to extend the rights and privileges of
prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention to Iraqi detainees').
By "US agents," I mean individuals acting under color of US law or authority. I do not define this
term to just encompass persons whose job title includes "agent," such as Special Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

9

Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages, Ali v Rumfeld, No 1:05-cv-01201 (ND III filed
Mar 1, 2005) 2005 WL 922428. Three other lawsuits were filed, but those defendants would be
liable only for abuse in Iraq. See Ali v Katpinski, No 9:05-cv-00654 (DSC filed Mar 1, 2005); Ali v
Pappas, No 3:05-cv-00371 (D Conn filed Mar 1, 2005); Mohammed v Sanchez, No 7:05-cv-00065
(SD Tex filed Mar 1, 2005).
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All four plaintiffs assert sexual humiliation and battery: they were all
forcibly stripped naked and photographed and they all suffered repeated anal
probing.'0 Mr. Ahmad was told that "soldiers would rape his wife"" and US
interrogators battered Mr. Shirullah until his right eardrum ruptured, thereby
causing permanent right ear deafness. 12 Mr. Siddiqi endured long hours of sleep
deprivation by the continual "throwing [of] stones at him and other detainees all
night."' 3 Such constant abuse has caused near paralysis 4 and impairments of
vision, hearing, and memory."
Mustafa Ait Idr, among other plaintiffs, is suing the US Department of
Defense under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")16 to discover physical
evidence of his torture at Guantanamo. 17 He claims that "U.S. military guards
jumped on his head until he had a stroke that paralyzed his face, nearly drowned
him in a toilet and later broke several of his fingers."' 8
2. Third-party Accounts
Detainees' reports have not been confined to formal legal filings. A host of
news reports have relied on detainees' statements to frame the picture of US
detention and abuse. Murat Kurnaz asserts that at Guantanamo "[he] had his
head forced under water,... was tortured with electric shocks and.., was
sexually humiliated by female interrogators."' 9 Moazzam Begg wrote to a court
that "he has been repeatedly beaten and has heard 'the terrifying screams of
fellow detainees facing similar methods.' He said he witnessed two detainees die
after US military personnel had beaten them. ' ' 2° Mamdouh Habib arrived at
Guantanamo "in 'catastrophic shape'... [m]ost of his fingernails were missing,
and while sleeping at the prison he regularly bled from his nose, mouth and
ears." 21 Despite such maladies, "US officials there denied him treatment," saying
10

Rumsfeld, No 1:05-cv-01201 at

11

Id at

12

Id at

155.b.
161.a, 162.
158.e.

13

Id at

14

Id at TT 156, 165.

155.b, 158.b, 161.e, 164.b.

15

Id at TT 162, 165.

16

The act is codified at 5 USC § 552 (2000).

17

Olesky v United States Departmentof Defense, No 1:05-cv-10735 (D Mass filed Apr 13, 2005).

18

Carol Leonnig, Guantanamo Detainee Suing U.S. to Get Video of Alleged Torture, Wash Post A2 (Apr

14, 2005).
19

DetaineeAlleges Torture at Guantanamo,St Petersburg Times 2A (Mar 10, 2005).

20

Carol D. Leonnig, FurtherDetaineeAbuse Alleged; Guantanamo Prison Citedin FBI Memos, Wash Post

Al (Dec 26, 2004).
21

Id.
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22
instead '"if you cooperate with your interrogators, then we can do something.'
Martin Mubanga, another Guantanamo detainee, has alleged sexual abuse,
that "American military police were treating him like a...
writing to his sister
' 21
prostitute.
male

B. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS REPORTS
The Red Cross is the neutral guardian of the Geneva Conventions' panoply
of human rights.24 While President Bush determined that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply to illegal combatants,2 and therefore the Red Cross
had no specific rights to guarantee, it did visit US detention centers such as
Guantanamo as a neutral observer,26 and reported its findings. Though these
reports are normally confidential, the Red Cross's summary of its June 2003
inspection of Guantanamo was leaked to American newspapers.27
This report claimed "the American military has intentionally used
psychological and sometimes physical coercion 'tantamount to torture' on
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba., 28 Specifically, an unknown number of
prisoners were subject to "humiliating acts, solitary confinement, temperature
extremes, use of forced positions," and "some beatings. ' 29 The detainees were
also victims of exposure to "severe temperatures, loud music and other
sounds,.., and forced nudity.' 30 The Red Cross also asserted that "some
doctors used patient records to help military investigators gather information,"
which if true, is considered by the ICRC as "a 'flagrant violation of medical
ethics." '

31

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

International Committee of the Red Cross, The ICRC's Status: In a Class of its Own, available online
1
at <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng.nsf/iwpIstl09/522C6628D83AO 9741256E3D003
FC85F> (visited Oct 25, 2005).
Memorandum from President Bush at 2 (cited in note 3).

25
26

27

28

The ICRC has been conducting inspections at Guantanamo since January 2002. Neil A. Lewis,
Red Cross Finds DetaineeAbuse in Guantanamo,NY Times Al (Nov 30, 2004).
See id. See also Josh White and John Mintz, Red Cross Cites 'nhumane" Treatment at Guantanamo,
Wash Post Al0 (Dec 1, 2004); Guy Taylor, Red Cross Sees "Problems" with PrisonerCare, Wash Times
A4 (Dec 1, 2004).
Lewis, Red Cross FindsDetaineeAbuse, NY Times at Al (cited in note 26). A literal interpretation of
the ICRC's use of "tantamount" suggests that the Red Cross viewed the alleged abuses as close
to, but were not in fact, actual torture.

29

Id.

30

White and Mintz, Red Cross Cites 'nhumane" Treatment, Wash Post at A10 (cited in note 27).
Id. See also M. Gregg Bloche and Jonathan H. Marks, When Doctors Go to War, 352 New Eng J
Med 3, 5 (2005) (noting "probable cause for suspecting" that the physicians engaged in torture

31
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The ICRC summarized the detainees' treatment at Guantanamo as
designed to "make them wholly dependent on their interrogators" and "cannot
be considered other than an intentional system of cruel, unusual and degrading
treatment and a form of torture." 32 In the eyes of the Red Cross, these acts
"violate[d] international rules against torture adopted by the United States and
other countries.

33

C. US AGENT REPORTS
Though the impressions and reports of US agents, like Red Cross reports,
are normally confidential, a successful ACLU FOA action has made many US
detention documents available to the public.34 These documents are striking in
their descriptions of abuse. One special agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") complained that Department of Defense interrogators
were "impersonating Supervisory Special Agents of the FBI" and were engaging
in "torture techniques" that "have produced no intelligence of a threat
neutralization nature to date. 35
Another FBI agent detailed his observations of torture at Guantanamo:
On a couple of occassions [sic], I entered interview rooms to find a detainee
chained hand and foot in a fetal position on the floor, with no chair, food,
or water. Most times they had urinated or defacated [sic] on themselves, and
had been left there for 18, 24 hours or more. On one occassion [sic], the air
conditioning had been turned down so far and the temperature was so cold
in the room, that the barefooted detainee was shaking with cold .... On
another occassion [sic], the A/C had been turned off, making the
temperature in the unventilated room probably well over 100 degrees. The
detainee was almost unconscious on the floor, with a pile of hair next to
him. He had apparently been literally pulling his hair out throughout the
night. On another occassion [sic] not only was the temperature unbearably
hot, but extremely loud rap music was being played in the room, and had
been since the day before, with the detainee chained hand and foot in the
36
fetal position on the floor.
and condemning it as a violation of medical ethics and "the laws of war"). But see Heather Mac

32

Donald, Torturing the Etidence: The Truth about the Doctors at Guantanamo,Weekly Standard 13 (Jan
24, 2005) for a rebuttal of Bloche and Marks's claims.
Lewis, Red Cross FindsDetainee Abuse, NY Times at Al (cited in note 26).

33

White and Mintz, Red Cross Cites 'qnbumane" Treatment, Wash Post at A10 (cited in note 27).

34

The ACLU's FOIA documents are available online at <http://www.aclu.org/Internaional/
International.cfm?ID=13962&c=36> (visited Oct 25, 2005).

35

E-mail from [redacted] to Gary Bald, et al (Dec 5, 2003), available online at <http://
www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI.121504.3977.pdf> (visited Oct 25, 2005) (hereinafter
Bald e-mail).
E-mail from [redacted], INSD [Inspection Division], FBI to Valerie E. Caproni, OGC [Office of
General Counsel], FBI, (date unavailable), available online at <http://www.aclu.org/

36
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Guantanamo is not the only base where US-led torture allegedly occurred.
As Rumsfeld asserted, US bases in Afghanistan are also sites of alleged abuse. The
Washington Post quoted an anonymous official at the Bagram air base "who has
supervised the capture and transfer of accused terrorists" as stating that '[i]f
you don't violate someone's human rights some of the time, you probably aren't
doing your job."' 37
These violations, often led by the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA").
were euphemistically titled 'stress and duress' techniques" and included
detainees being 'softened up' by MPs [military police] and US Army Special
Forces troops who beat them up and confine[d] them in tiny rooms" or "held
and deprived [them] of sleep with a 24[them] in awkward, painful positions
38
lights.,
of
hour bombardment
Cofer Black, head of the CIA Counterterrorist Center in September 2002,
alluded to abusive practices at a September 26, 2002 joint hearing of the House
and Senate intelligence committees. Mr. Black, while reluctant to discuss the
specifics of CIA interrogations, stated: "This is a highly classified area, but I
have to say that all you need to know: There was a39before 9/11, and there was
an after 9/11 ....After 9/11 the gloves come off."
Perhaps an example of the new gloveless technique is the treatment of Abu
Zubaida, a high-ranking al Qaeda member detained in Afghanistan in December
2002. Mr. Zubaida "was shot in the groin during his apprehension in Pakistan in
March [2002]. National security officials suggested that Zubaida's painkillers
40
While Bush
were used selectively in the beginning of his captivity.,
administration officials claim that the United States is "scrupulous in providing
voice, that 'pain
medical care to captives," one official "add[ed] in a deadpan
41
thing."'
subjective
very
a
is
patients]
wounded
[in
control
D.

DENIALS OF TORTURE

Denials of torture have come in two forms: that there was no predicate
abuse of detainees, or that detainees were abused but such abuse is not torture
torturefoia/released/FBI_5053_5054.pdf> (visited Oct 25, 2005). The substance of this report
was corroborated by the New York Times through a series of interviews with "military guards,
intelligence agents, and others." Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse, NY Times at Al (cited in
note 26).
37
38

Dana Priest and Barton Geliman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations, 'Stress and Duress'
Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, Wash Post Al (Dec 26, 2002).
Id.

40

Id.
Id.

41

Id.

39
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because it was either not grave enough or because the abuse was justified. These
categories blend into each other, but I will attempt to address each in turn.
1. There Was No Abuse
Heather Mac Donald, an ardent defender of US practices, stridently claims
that US interrogations did not rise to the level of abuse, let alone torture.
Describing the military as "restrained," she lists:
what the interrogators assumed they could not do without clearance from
the secretary of defense: yell at detainees (though never in their ears), use

deception (such as posing as Saudi intelligence agents), and put detainees on
MREs (meals ready to eat-vacuum-sealed food pouches eaten by millions
of soldiers, as well as vacationing backpackers) instead of hot rations....
The most controversial technique approved was "mild, non-injurious

physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and
light pushing," to be reserved only for a "very small percentage of
the most
42
uncooperative detainees" believed to possess critical intelligence.

Mac Donald concedes that there was at least one abusive technique: waterboarding, "temporarily submerging a detainee in water to induce the sensation of
drowning., 43 She notes that this "is the most extreme measure the CIA has
applied, according to a former Justice Department attorney, and arguably it
crosses the line into torture."'
The United States has also denied that it abused detainees. The
Department of Defense first categorically denied allegations of detainee abuse,45
but the Pentagon altered its denials after continuous allegations and
investigations of torture, stating that "the military has been careful not to abuse
detainees and has complied with treaties on the handling of enemy prisoners 'to
the extent possible' in the middle of a war., 46 This caveat changes the flat
prohibition against torture into a balancing test: the US will not abuse detainees
so long as abuse is not necessary to the war effort.47
This balancing is grounded in official US policy. Secretary Rumsfeld
ordered that "[t]he Combatant Commanders shall, in detaining Al Qaida and
Taliban individuals under the control of the Department of Defense, treat them
42

Heather Mac Donald, How to Interrogate Teonrists, 15 City J 24, 30 (2005). This article is an excellent
survey and defense of US practices.

43

Id at 32.

44

Id.

45

White and Mintz, Red Cross Cites 'Tnhumane" Treatment, Wash Post at A10 (cited in note 27).
Leonnig, FurtherDetaineeAbuse Alleged, Wash Post at Al (emphasis added) (cited in note 20).

46

47

Some US officials have further grounded the implicit cost-benefit balancing test by "defend[ing]
some cases of harsh treatment by saying it was simply the cost of the so-called global war on

terror." Kate Zernike, Newy Released Reports Show Early Concern on PrisonAbuse, NY Times Al (Jan
6, 2005).
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humanely and, to the extent appropriateand consistent with military necessioy, in a manner
consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. ' '48 President
Bush reaffirmed this order on February 7, 2002.49
2. There Was Abuse, But It Was Not Torture
Even if US agents abused detainees, it does not follow that this abuse was
torture. The abuse could have remained below the level of torture or the abuse
could have been justified.5 °
a) The abuse did not rise to the level of torture. This specific defense is
difficult to mount given the volume of conflicting evidence. Heather Mac
Donald tried to argue that the severity of coercion was not at the level of
torture. It is also possible to argue that severe, nearly tortuous abuse is not
torture because it was infrequently inflicted or because it was against US policy.
Mac Donald asserts both of these defenses. "Without question, some war
on terror detainees have been abused, some have even died in custody. But that
abuse was in violation of official policy, not pursuant to it."51 Perhaps there can
be a distinction between torture and acts of torture-just as international law
recognizes a difference between genocide and acts of genocide-but the
"violation of official policy" defense is a non-starter.
First, as noted above, official US policy implicitly allowed torture if it was
militarily necessary. This general permission is grounded in concrete guidance.
On December 2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld countenanced "counter-resistance
techniques" such as the "[d]eprivation of light and auditory stimuli," the
"[r]emoval of clothing," and "[t]he use of stress-positions such as the proposed
standing for a maximum of four hours" in Guantanamo interrogations.52

48

Memorandum from Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Status of Taliban and Al Qaida 0an 19, 2002) (hereinafter Memorandum from
Secretary Rumsfeld to the Joint Chiefs of Staff) (emphasis added) (on file with author).

49

50

51
52

"I hereby reaffirm the order previously issued by the Secretary of Defense to the United States
Armed Forces requiring that the detainees be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and
consistentnith military necessiy, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva." Memorandum
from President Bush at 5 (emphasis added) (cited in note 3).
This last reason is predicated on the belief that "justified torture" is an oxymoron, that is, if
torture-level coercion is inflicted but the coercion is justified, that coercion is not torture. I do not
accept this view, and conceive the questions of the factual existence of torture and its justification
as separate inquiries. One cannot intelligently discuss acts of torture and possible justifications if
one decides a priori that justified torture is not torture at all.
Mac Donald, Tortuing the Evidence, Weekly Standard at 14 (cited in note 31).
Action memorandum from William J. Haynes 11, General Counsel, US Department of Defense,
to the Secretary of Defense, Counter-Resistance Techniques 6 (Nov 27, 2002) (approved by Secretary
Rumsfeld on Dec 2, 2002) (hereinafter Rumsfeld Approval Memorandum) (on file with author).
It is possible that Secretary Rumsfeld approved the use of stress-positions for up to eight to ten
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Secretary Rumsfeld rescinded his December 2 authorization on January 15,
2003."3 But, for one and one-half months, the US military was authorized to use
sensory deprivation, forced nudity, and long-term stress-positions in detainee
interrogations.
The violation of official policy defense takes for granted that the official
policy of the United States was the implicit and explicit authorization of abusive
techniques. And, even if torture were not authorized, the United States had a
duty to ensure that its servicemen obeyed the chain of command and that they
did not torture. Perhaps the United States should not be held responsible for an
isolated individual act of torture, but the evidence demonstrates that the torture
was widespread. The United States breached its duty of care when the torture
became systemic, even if that torture was in "violation of official policy."
b) The abuse was justified and therefore was not torture.54 If one accepts that
detainees were abused, one can attempt to mitigate the abuse by arguing that it
was justified-or at least required-by the war effort. The Administration's
initial schema for detainee treatment implicitly permitted abuse if it served
"military necessity." Could the abuse be excused away by legitimate military
needs? Are there other justifications?
Defenders of US conduct have advanced three exculpatory rationales:
(1) the aforementioned military necessity; (2) domestic organizations engage in
similar behavior; and (3) the benefits gained by US abstention from torturenamely, the expectation that an enemy will treat its prisoners reciprocally, and
thus humanely-no longer apply in the War on Terror.
The military necessity logic is essentially that detainees have material
information that can only be collected, or can only be timely collected, if the
questioners resort to abusive interrogation. War on Terror detainees, the logic
goes, were immune to regular interrogation techniques because they believed
that they would not be punished if they did not cooperate with interrogators 5
and because motivators that worked on traditional detainees, such as love of
family or love of life, "had little purchase among the terrorists... 'The jihadists

hours instead of just four. He wrote "I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4
hours?" Id at 1.
53

Memorandum from Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to Commander
USSOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command, the command responsible for
Guantanamo], Counter-ResistanceTechniques (U) (Jan 15, 2003) (on file with author).

54

See note 50 for a rejection of the logic that justification prevents an act from being characterized
as torture.

55

Al Qaeda manuals revealed that uncooperative behavior "carried no penalties and certainly no risk
of torture-a sign, gloated the manuals, of American weakness." Mac Donald, 15 City J at 26
(cited in note 42).
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would tell you, "I've divorced this life, I don't care about my family,"' recalls an
interrogator at Guantanamo. 'You couldn't shame them."' 6
Interrogators also claim that the laconic detainees possessed information
vital to prosecuting the war and defending US interests. Chris Mackey, a former
US interrogator in Afghanistan, lamented that reliance on 'ineffective
schoolhouse methods"' meant "that his team 'failed to break prisoners who I
have no doubt knew of terrorist plots or at least terrorist cells that may one day
do us harm. Perhaps they would have talked if faced with harsher methods.' 57
Expanding on his argument, Mackey noted that the use of harsher techniques
meant that they received better information sooner.5 8
While some interrogators may claim that coercive techniques produced
useful intelligence, others claim the exact opposite. At least one FBI agent
complained that Guantanamo torture "tactics have produced no intelligence of a
threat neutralization nature to date" and that the "techniques have destroyed any
chance of prosecuting this detainee."5 9 The dispute between the effectiveness of
torture and military necessity will be discussed again in Section III.B, but it is
important to recognize here that it has been offered as a reason why abuse did
not become torture.
Another reason why abuse might have not equaled torture is because
domestic organs used similar techniques. Mac Donald speculates that "if a bootcamp drill sergeant can make a recruit kneel with arms stretched out in front
without violating the Convention Against Torture, an interrogator can use that
tool against a recalcitrant terror suspect., 60 Or, during the interrogation of
Mohamedou Ould Slahi, an al Qaeda agent who recruited two of the September
11 pilots, "an army interrogator suggested, 'Why don't you mention to him that
conspiracy is a capital offense?"' 61 The FBI agent conducting the interrogation
rejected this tactic because he believed that "any covert threat [which] inflicts
'severe mental pain"' 62 violates the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Convention Against
Torture").6 3 Mac Donald dismisses this concern by noting "district attorneys and

56

Id.

57

Id at 35.
Id at 28.

58

59
60

Bald e-mail (cited in note 35).
Mac Donald, 15 CityJ at 28 (cited in note 42).

61

Id at 30.

62

Id.

63

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(1984), 1465 UN Treaty Set 85 (1987).
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police detectives routinely invoke the possibility of harsh criminal penalties to
get criminals to confess. 64
This justification is inapt. Marginally tortuous behavior-as opposed to
abuse that is clearly torture-may be permissible in the domestic context. This is
especially true when one considers Mac Donald's examples. A military recruit
directly elected to participate in boot camp whereas an unlawful combatant65 at
most indirectly elected to run the risk of capture, and the even smaller risk of
abuse,66 by fighting. One could also argue that law enforcement's implicit threats
are more ancillary to prosecuting crime than torture is to detainee
interrogations. 67 Regardless, domestic use of a policy does not automatically
justify its use in foreign affairs. This excuse is flawed because it fails to recognize
the inherent difference between internal and external relations and because it
assumes, without a priori justification, that the domestic practice is itself not
torturous.6 8

The final rationale for not equating abuse with torture is that the United
States is fighting a new type of enemy in a new type of war.69 This enemy attacks
office buildings instead of front line positions and "flout[s] every civilized norm
animating the [Geneva] conventions."7 An instrumental reason to respect
international humanitarian law vis-A-vis the enemy is that the enemy will then
respect such norms vis-A-vis one's own troops. Yet, American compliance with
humanitarian law has not caused terrorists to treat US servicemen humanely.7'
Because the United States has not incurred reciprocal benefits by complying
with customary international law, and because noncompliance seems not to
64

Mac Donald, 15 CityJ at 30 (cited in note 42).

65

Assuming that he was actually a combatant and was not mistakenly caught in the overbroad US

66

dragnet.
See discussion in note 55 that al Qaeda manuals stated that US troops would not torture

67

detainees, which would make an al Qaeda agent more likely to discount the risk of torture.
Though this may be a distinction without a difference.

68

69

To be clear, I am not implying that either of Mac Donald's examples of domestic tactics violates
the customary international law against torture. On first glance I do not believe that they do, and
even if I did, such an argument would be well outside the scope of this Comment.
See Draft Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to the President,
Decision re Applicaion of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict uith al Qaeda and the
Taliban 2 (Jan 25, 2002) (describing the current conflict as a "new kind of war" and a "new
paradigm render[ing] obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners")
(hereinafter Gonzales Draft Memorandum) (on file with author).

70
71

Mac Donald, 15 City J at 27 (cited in note 42).
"[Olur adversaries in several recent conflicts have not been deterred by GPW [Geneva
Convention III on the Treatment of Prisoners of War] in their.., mistreatment of captured US
personnel, and terrorists will not follow GPW rules in any event." Gonzales Draft Memorandum
at 3 (cited in note 69).
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carry additional risks, what is the instrumental reason for not abusing or
torturing detainees?
This argument, like all the other defenses, falls prey to the unsupported
assumption that abuse, if justified, is per se not torture. Torture speaks to
conduct, not to the conduct's reasons. To define torture not based on its acts
but on its motives is to conflate two very different inquiries. One should not
venture down this confusing intellectual path and one should not let the reasons
for abuse-even if they are good ones-obfuscate the inquiry into the facts of
abuse.
E. THE EVIDENCE OVERALL: WAS THERE TORTURE?
Torture is defined at length in Section II.A.4, but as a preliminary matter,
of torture must be specifically intended to cause severe physical pain, such
act
an
as that of serious physical injury, or mental pain or suffering lasting for
significant duration. With this in mind, I conclude that the United States
tortured detainees at Guantanamo and in Afghanistan.
Some of the allegations may be false,72 but one cannot reasonably dismiss
all of the claims wholesale. There is probable cause to believe that some acts of
torture occurred, and that these acts were not limited to a sole locale or to a
discrete set of offenders, but pervaded the system of US detention.
This torture is not confined to past behavior. Recent evidence suggests that
Guantanamo officials have continued to torture detainees73 and that the CIA has
4
detained and tortured al Qaeda members at secret facilities in Eastern Europe.
Further, the White House has refused to disclose information about the CIA's
"detention of high-level terror suspects" to the full House and Senate
intelligence oversight committees, and is restricting that information-"how and
where the prisoners are being held and interrogated"-to the committees'
chairmen and ranking minority members.7 Torture may be continuing and
Congress-the people's representative-is being denied robust oversight.

72

See Lewis, Red CrossFinds DetaineeAbuse, NY Times at A1 (cited in note 26) (dismissing the claim
that US forces at Guantanamo employed prostitutes as interrogators as "so implausible"). But see
Erik Saar and Viveca Novak, Inside the Wire: A Militaty Intelligence Soldier'sEyewitness Account of L'fe at
Guantanamo 191-92, 222-28 (Penguin 2005) (noting the sexual taunting of male detainees by US
servicewomen).

73

See Abuse at GuantanamoHasn't Stopped, Say Kuwaiti Prisoners,Kuwait Times (Jan 22, 2005).

74

Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons;Debate Is Growing within Ageny About Legaliy
and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After 9/ 11, Wash Post A01 (Nov 2, 2005).
Douglas Jehl, White House Has Tighty Restricted Oversight of CIA Detentions, Officials Say, NY Times
A21 (Apr 6, 2005).

75

Winter 2006

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

US Senator John McCain has asserted Congress's legislative prerogative by
introducing an amendment-approved by the Senate on October 5, 2005-that
would prohibit the "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" of
any "individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States
Government, regardless of nationality or physical location."76 Though this
amendment reiterates existing law," President Bush has threatened to veto it.78
Indeed, rather than entertaining a change in tactics, the President has insisted
that 'We will not relent"79 and that 'We will keep our nerve."8 °
II. TORTURE IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Because there is a reasonable likelihood that US agents tortured detainees,
this Comment now moves from the existence of torture to whether that torture
violated customary international law. Customary international law, unlike
treaties, is often hard to discern. While treaties are grounded in text, customary
international law is the product of two nebulous prerequisites: custom that is "a
general and consistent practice of states, ' 81 and opiniojuris, the requirement that
states conform to this custom out of a "sense of legal obligation. ' 82 This Section
inquires whether there is a customary international norm against torture, and
finding that there is, it asks whether US torture violated it. Because of space
limitations, I do not attempt to prove from first principles that the customary
international law against torture exists; for the sake of brevity, I only show that
there is such a law.

76

S Amend 1977, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (Oct 3, 2005) in 109 Cong Rec S 10908-09 (hereinafter
McCain Amendment).

77

Specifically, the McCain Amendment requires that the Defense Department's interrogations must
conform to the United States Field Army Manual on Intelligence Interrogation and also that
persons under US control must be accorded their Constitutional right to be free from "cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." Id.
Eric Schmitt, Senate Moves to Protect Miitagy Pisoners Despite Veto Threat, NY Times A22 (Oct 6,
2005).

78
79

President George W. Bush, Remarks to the NationalEndowmentfor Democracy, 2005 Weekly Comp
Pres Doc 1502, 1506 (Oct 6, 2005).

80

Id at 1507.

81

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (1987) (hereinafter
Third Restatement).

82

Id.
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A. Is THERE A CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF TORTURE?
1. Custom
Finding custom is a tricky proposition, especially when the custom is the
absence of something, for instance, the absence of torture. Perhaps due to the
difficulty of pure empiricism, the custom prong of international law can be
satisfied by 'consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law;
or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognizing and enforcing that law."' 83
The prohibition against torture grows out of all three sources of custom.
Empirically, most states refrain from torture. This restraint is not shared by all
states, though the degree of deviation is not clear. Before examining the extent
of violations, one must recognize that torture only violates international custom
if it is committed as official state action; customary international law is not
offended by private, non-state acts of torture.84 Because the custom against
torture only looks to state acts, violations can defeat this custom only if they are
official state policy.
Professors Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner note that courts and
scholars characterize the number of torturing states as "many."85 Human Rights
Watch also describes this set as "many," but their worldwide torture summary
lists just sixteen offending countries.86 A cursory search of the US State
Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Pracices suggests that more than
twenty-five countries have some form of official torture.87 While "many" may be

83

84

85

86

87

Filartigav Pena-Irala,630 F2d 876, 880 (2d Cir 1980), quoting UnitedStates v Smith, 18 US (5 Wheat)
153, 160-61 (1820). See also The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677, 700 (1900) (noting that "the works
of jurists and commentators" can be used as evidence of the "customs and usages of civilized
nations").
See Third Restatement § 702 cmt b (cited in note 81); Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d
774, 795 (DC Cir 1984) (Edwards concurring). See also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, International
HumanitarianLaw as Customary InternationalLaw, 21 Refugee Survey Q 186, 190 (2002).
Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw, 66 U Chi L Rev
1113, 1117 (1999) (noting "many nations of the world torture their citizens').
See Human Rights Watch, Tortare Worldwide, available online at <http://hrw.org/english/
docs/2005/04/27/china10549.htm> (visited Oct 25, 2005). The sixteen countries are: China,
Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia,
Syria, Turkey, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.
A listing of the various countries covered by the report is available online at
<http://www.state.gov/g/dri/rls/hrrpt/2004/> (visited Oct 25, 2005). The countries' torture is
often technically illegal but is still perpetrated by government agents.
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hard to quantify, the clear majority of states do not torture.8 8 And, of the states
that do torture, they still recognize, albeit emptily, that an anti-torture norm
exists. "[E]veryone involved in the commission of torture acts on the
assumption that it is illegal; no one acts on the assumption that it is legal under a
new rule which would allow for torture."89
If international custom could only be derived from actual state behavior,
the practice of torture might undercut the norm. For the purposes of customary
international law, however, the sources of international custom are not so
limited; norms can be gleaned from learned legal writings9 ° and official state
pronouncements. 91 These two sources strongly support the existence of an antitorture norm.
One can divine official state pronouncements from a -multitude of sources,
including: diplomatic statements and protests, official legal opinions, policy
statements, press releases, domestic legislation and judicial decisions, and
treaties.92 A brief survey of the international legal and domestic US landscapes
demonstrates the vitality of official state policy against torture.
The international community has repeatedly and forcefully repudiated
torture, 93 and this repudiation is shared by the United States. For example, it is a
federal crime to commit or to attempt to commit torture outside of the United
States,94 and federal district courts have original jurisdiction over suits by aliens
who have allegedly been tortured." US courts have consistently recognized the
existence of a customary international law against torture96 and President Bush's

89

See Nuru v GonZales, 404 F3d 1207, 1222-23 nn 11-12 (9th Cir 2005) (listing nations and
agreements that outlaw torture).
Henckaerts, 21 Refugee Survey Q at 190 (cited in note 84).

90

See, for example, Filarfiga,630 F2d at 880.

91

Henckaerts, 21 Refugee Survey Q at 190 (cited in note 84).

92

Id at 190--92.

93

See, for example, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), art
17, 6 UST 3316, 3330-32 (prohibiting torture of prisoners of war); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (1966), art 7, 6 ILM 368, 370 (1967); Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (1998), arts 7-8, 37 ILM 999, 1004-1009.

88

94

18 USC § 2340A (2000).

95

Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-256, 106 Stat 73 (1992).

96

Sosa v Alvarez-Macbain, 542 US 692, 762 (2004) (Breyer concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Nuru, 404 F3d at 1222; Kadic v Karadc,70 F3d 232, 243 (2d Cir 1995); Siderman de
Blake v Republic of Agentina, 965 F2d 699, 717 (9th Cir 1992); Filarliga,630 F2d at 880. Even Judge
Edwards's concurrence in Tel-Oren, which rejected an international norm against private acts of
torture, conceded that official torture violates customary international law. Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at
795 (Edwards concurring).
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All of these statements
administration has expressed official anti-torture views.97
98
norm.
anti-torture
an
of
existence
the
support
and laws
International legal scholars agree, perhaps unanimously, that there is an
international custom against torture. 99 Even scholars critical of the "new"
customary international law,100 the part of customary international law in which
the torture prohibition falls, concede that the torture norm exists; their
objections are that (1) its foundation is illegitimate; (2) the norm does not
accurately reflect state practice; and (3) its judicial and academic support is the
product of fiat, not reasoned reflection and analysis.'0 '
All of this may be true, but the critics have aimed their fire at the wrong
level of analysis. This Comment looks at what the law is, not whether the law is
properly founded. The Supreme Court cautioned that academic work, for the
purposes of the courts, should be relied upon "not for the speculations of their
authors concering what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of
what the law really is.' 10 2 Further, whether or not the norm has a questionable
pedigree, its independent life bootstraps its legitimacy. It might have been utterly
foundationless at birth, but its existence has helped animate state (rhetorical)
compliance,'0 3 scholarly articles, and judicial decisions, all of which legitimize the
norm.

97

98
99

President George W. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions with HungarianPrimeMinisterPeter Medgyesy
and an Exchange with Reporters, 2004 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 1130, 1131 (Jun 22, 2004) (stating that
the "position of my Government and our country" does "not condone torture"); Paula
Dobriansky, Under Secretary for Global Affairs and Michael Kozak, Acting Assistant Secretary
for Democracy Human Rights and Labor, On-the-Record Briefing on the Release of the 2004 Annual
Report on Human Rights (Feb 28, 2005), available online at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/
rls/spbr/42805.htm> (visited Oct 25, 2005) (noting that President Bush "has been very clear on
the issue of torture, which is we are against it' (hereinafter Dobriansky and Kozak press
conference).
See Henckaerts, 21 Refugee Survey Q at 190 (cited in note 84).
See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimafy of InternationalHuman
Rights Itigation, 66 Fordham L Rev 319, 345 (1997) (noting "academic commentators have almost
uniformly endorsed the modern position" of customary international law, of which the norm

against torture is a part).
100 New customary international law is distinguished from its traditional cousin on at least three

grounds: it is less concerned with actual state practice, it can develop at a quicker pace, and it
speaks to the treatment of individuals rather than just to state-to-state relations. Curtis A. Bradley
and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Criique of the Modern
Posilion, 110 Harv L Rev 815, 842 (1997).
101 Id at 839-42; Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L Rev at 341-45 (cited in note 99).
102 Sosa, 542 US at 734, quoting The Paquete Habana,175 US at 700 (emphasis added).
103

States' acts may not always obey the norm against torture, but the violators do not claim to be in
non-compliance. See Henckaerts, 21 Refugee Survey Q at 190 (cited in note 84).
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Though state custom, by itself, may not fully establish an international
norm against torture, the other sources of custom-scholarly writings and
official state pronouncements-conclusively do. Further, torture falls under the
"new" set of customary international law," 4 meaning that conclusive evidence of
rhetoric can outweigh weaker empirical evidence. Under this test, there is an
international custom against torture.
2. Opinio Juris
The opiniojuris requirement-states comply with the norm against torture
out of a sense of legal obligation-is also often hard to find. One typically relies
on the same evidence used to prove the existence of a custom-treaties and
conventions, for example-but this dual use may lead to a problem of
circularity.
Still, one can infer that the United States undertook a sense of legal
obligation by entering into binding anti-torture agreements. Some of these
agreements, for example, the Convention Against Torture, 05 vested the United
States with legal duties. Even if the United States did not observe the antitorture norm for opinio juis reasons beforehand, the agreements' legal
responsibilities mean that subsequent compliance flows from, at least in part, a
sense of legal obligation. Opiniojuris does not require the exclusion of alternate
state motivations. Even if the United States did not torture for reasons
independent of legal duties,' 1 6 the opiniojuris requirement is met because one of
the US motives was legal obligation.
3. Jus Cogens
Most examples of customary international law condition binding force
upon state consent. If a state does not consent to be bound by an international
norm, if it persistently objects, the state cannot be held liable for violating the
norm once it crystallizes into customary international law.
Jus cogens is an exception to the default requirement of state consent.
Customary international law that is jus cogens requires universal compliance; a
state cannot lawfully derogate from that norm or contract around it. The

104

See discussion around note 100.

105 The United States's consent to the Convention Against Torture was conditioned on reservations,

106

understandings, and declarations ("RUDs'", but these RUDs did not undercut the principle that
the United States was committing itself to some legal obligations.
Perhaps because torture is politically unpopular.
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customary international law of torture is a vibrant example of ajus cogens norm
that scholars" 7 and tribunals0 8 have consistently recognized.
Thejus cogens facet further cements this law's existence. Nonjus cogens laws
can be changed and repealed by consistent state violation. Jus cogens norms
cannot because violations are "not viewed as evidence against their CIL
[customary international law] status, but rather [are] disregarded as mere
lawbreaking."' 9 Non-compliance, even if widespread, does not impeach the
prerequisite state custom.
4. The Definition of Torture
Torture is defined in myriad instruments and there is no single, consistent
definition. Fortunately, this Comment only needs to articulate torture's outer
contours. An exhaustive definition does not matter if the United States breached
torture's minimum requirements.
The Convention Against Torture defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession.., when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. 110
The United States acceded to this convention, but its accession was subject to a
set of reservations, understandings, and declarations ("RUDs"). These RUDs
declared that the United States understood torture to require a specific intent to
"inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering" where "mental pain or
suffering refers to prolonged mental harm" from, inter alia, "the intentional
infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering" or "the
threat of imminent death" of the victim or a third party."'

109

Third Restatement § 702 cmt n (cited in note 81); Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets
Private Law HamomniZation: The Coming Conflict, 30 Yale J Intl L 211, 275 (2005); Bradley and
Goldsmith, 110 Harv L Rev at 840 (cited in note 100).
155-56 (Dec 10, 1998); Sosa, 542 US at
ProsecutorvFurundrZa,Case No IT-95-17/1, Judgment,
762 (Breyer concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Nuru, 404 F3d at 1222, citing
Siderman de Blake, 965 F2d at 717; PrincZ v FederalRepublc of Germany, 26 F3d 1166, 1173 (DC Cir
1994), citing Third Restatement § 702; cmt n.
Bradley and Goldsmith, 110 Harv L Rev at 840 (cited in note 100).

110

Convention Against Torture, art 1 (cited in note 63).

111

11.1(a)
Convention Against Torture, reservation made by the United States (Oct 21, 1994),
(hereinafter US RUDs); Implementation of Torture Convention in Extradition Cases, 22 CFR §
95.1(b) (2005). This altered definition is codified at 18 USC § 2340 (2000). The McCain
Amendment's definition of "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" is explicitly
tied to these US RUDs.

107

108
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The United States further narrowed this definition, holding that the torture
label "only appl[ies] to acts directed against persons in the offender's custody or
physical control""' 2 and that "the term 'acquiescence' requires that the public
official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity
and thereafter breach his legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such
' 3

activity." "

The Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel interpreted this
definition to require "pain that is difficult to endure... equivalent in intensity to
the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment
of bodily function, or even death."' 4 Mental pain or suffering "must result from
one of the predicate acts listed in the statute" and "must result in significant
psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even
years."''

5

Ignoring this technical, narrow definition for a moment, President Bush
has publicly claimed that he is opposed to torture, broadly defined: "the
President has been very clear on the issue of torture, which is we are against itand torture by anyone's common-sense definition of it, not some fancy
definition.""' 6 Independent of this rhetoric, the US definition of torture is very
narrow.
Because states cannot make treaties to contract aroundjus cogens norms,117
US obligation under the norm against torture should be unaltered by its RUDs.
One can put this issue aside, however, because the abuse of detainees consisted
of torture even under the restrictive US definition.
Therefore, for this Comment, torture is defined as an act (1) specifically
intended to inflict (2) severe physical pain that is difficult to endure and
equivalent to serious physical injury or (3) mental pain or suffering lasting for a
significant duration and arising from the intentional or threatened infliction of

112

US RUDs at

11.1(b); 22 CFR 5 95.1(b)(4).

113

US RUDs at

I.1(d); 22 CFR5 95.1(b)(5).

114

Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, US
Department of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct
for Interrogation under 18 USC ff 2340-2340A 1 (Aug 1, 2002) (hereinafter Bybee Torture
Memorandum) (on file with author).

11s

Id. This memorandum was eventually rescinded by the Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, US Department of Justice, to James B.
Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 USC §5ff2340-2340A
(Dec 30, 2004) (on file with author).
Dobriansky and Kozak press conference (cited in note 97).

116
117

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), art 53, 8 ILM 679, 698-99. The United
States is not a party to this convention, but the principle, as a matter of common sense, should
apply just the same.
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severe pain or suffering, the threat of imminent death, or the threat that another
person will be subject to the same. The victim must be within the actor's
custody or physical control, the abuse must be official and not private conduct,
and a public official can only be vicariously liable if he instigated the torture or
had actual prior knowledge of its existence and failed to stop it.
B.

DID THE UNITED STATES VIOLATE THE CUSTOMARY

INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TORTURE?

1. Was the Abuse Torture?
The above definition sets out three necessary elements of torture: first, the
victim must be within the alleged torturer's custody or physical control; second,
the torturer must have specific intent; third, the torture must cause severe
physical or mental pain. These elements are combined with a final general
requirement: torture must be the product of official acts." 8 US abuse satisfies all
four requirements, thus the abuse of detainees violates the customary
international law against torture.
a) Custody orphysicalcontrol. This element is the easiest to prove. All of
the detainees at Guantanamo and the Afghani bases were under the custody and
physical control of the abusing US agents, thereby meeting the first element's
requirement.
b) Specific intent. The element of specific intent requires a more
involved proof. The cold record relied upon in Section I does not include
confessions by US agents that they abused detainees with the specific intent to
torture. But, as a matter of logic, specific intent can be inferred from conduct;" 9
I make such an attempt here.
Because torture requires the specific intent to inflict severe physical or
mental pain, abuse that is incidental to interrogations is per se not torturous.
Under this metric, yelling at detainees, feeding detainees military rations instead
of hot meals, and 'mild, non-injurious physical contact'" 2 ° are not torture; one
can reasonably infer from these acts that the intent was to gain information, not
to torture, and any discomfort was ancillary to this primary goal.
But information gathering can cross into sadism. Jumping on a detainee's
head until he has a stroke that paralyzes his face,' 2' forcing a detainee's head

118

Third Restatement § 702 cmt b (cited in note 81).

119 See Times-Picayune PublishingCo v United States, 345 US 594, 614 (1953).
120

See Mac Donald, 15 CityJ at 30 (cited in note 42).

121

Leonnig, GuantanamoDetainee Suing U.S., Wash Post at A2 (cited in note 18).
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under water and inflicting electric shocks,'2 2 raping detainees and photographing
124
them naked,'23 or threatening a detainee that "soldiers would rape his wife,'
are not techniques designed to elicit information but are cruel acts motivated by
a specific desire to severely harm detainees. This sadistic motive is the specific
intent to torture.
This inference is buttressed by the fact that many of the grossly abusive
techniques did not produce intelligence. 25 If the sadism yielded information, one
could argue that the abuse, while severe, was still motivated by the search for
intelligence. But one cannot reasonably claim that abuse that is ineffective at
developing intelligence originated from a motive to gather intelligence. Why
persist in using ineffective techniques if one is truly seeking knowledge? The
only reasonable answer is that the abusers had the specific intent to torture.
c) Severephysicalor mentalpain. The touchstone in proving severe pain is
the actual acts of abuse and, like specific intent, not all abuse rises to the level 1of26
torture. But shooting a detainee in the groin and withholding pain medication,
beating and deafening a detainee by rupturing his right eardrum, 2 7 or repeatedly
raping a prisoner 128 are all injuries that result in severe, hard-to-endure physical
pain. Indeed, the rupturing of the right eardrum is per se organ failure. 129 Having
one's wife threatened with gang rape 3 ° is a threat of immense third-party
suffering that could cause intense long-term psychological distress. All of these
examples demonstrate that some abuse caused severe harms, thereby proving
the third element.
d) Offi ial acts. Only official conduct can transform torture-like abuse
into actual torture; abuse by private individuals, no matter how injurious, by
definition cannot be torture. 3 ' The abuse of detainees was the product of
official acts because they were committed by US agents, who were supervised
and controlled by the US government, and who acted pursuant to official US
policy.

122

Detainee Alleges Torture, St Petersburg Times at 2A (cited in note 19).

123 Rumsfeld, No 1:05-cv-01201 at
124

Id at

158.b.

155.b.

125 See Bald e-mail (noting that the "torture techniques" at Guantanamo "have produced no
intelligence of a threat neutralization nature to date") (cited in note 35).
126 Priest and Gelman, U.S. DecriesAbuse, Wash Post at Al (cited in note 37).
127

Rumfeld, No 1:05-cv-01201 at

128 Id at

129
130

161.a-162.

158.b.

See Bybee Torture Memorandum at I (cited in note 114).
Rumsfeld, No 1:05-cv-01201 at 155.b.

131 Third Restatement § 702 cmt b (cited in note 81).
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The logical chain between acts committed by US officials and official acts
is self-evident. But, some critics contend that though US agents committed the
abuse, it was not official conduct because the offenders were acting contrary to
official policy. 13 2 The other two rationales-(1) the offenders were supervised by
the US chain of command and (2) official US policy permitted abuse-must be
developed to rebut this challenge.
Most of the abusers were US servicemen who were subject to the
command and control of the military's chain of command. The definition of
torture excuses the acts of subordinates if their superiors did not have prior
knowledge of the torture; it is official conduct only when a superior has prior
knowledge and fails to stop the abuse. Detainees were repeatedly abused in US
custody. Commanders could have been ignorant of the initial incidences until
the abuse became systemic-as it did at Guantanamo and in Afghanistan. After
umpteenth acts of abuse, only a fool would believe that, if left unchecked, the
abuse would not continue.
Further, abuse was reported in the press, lawsuits, and official government
channels.'33 This abuse, once systemic, must have given the superiors reason to
suspect continued abuse; if not, the commanders were willfully and woefully
ignorant. The marginal acts of systemic abuse were official conduct,
transforming the sadism into torture.
Official US policy also sanctioned abuse prior to its commission. Secretary
Rumsfeld approved "counter-resistance techniques.' 34 These stress techniques
have resulted in lasting, significant pain and injury, 135 and according to military
investigations, they resulted, at least in part, from Secretary Rumsfeld's
authorization. 1 36 In addition to explicit authorization, the Bush Administration
implicitly authorized abuse if its commanders deemed it militarily necessary."'
These four elements-US control, specific intent, severe physical or mental
harm, and official policy-establish that some of the detainee abuse constituted
torture and thereby violated customary international law.
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See the ACLU's FOIA documents (cited in note 34).
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Rumsfeld to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (cited in note 48).
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2. How Is the United States Bound by the Customary International
Law of Torture?
Customary international law imposes obligations on nations, but it does
not dictate how or if a state discharges these duties.' 38 Thejus cogens norm against
torture binds the United States, but its domestic law controls how this binding
force is expressed.
The Supreme Court is typically reluctant to give domestic force to
customary international law""9 and it is generally understood that Congress has
the power to violate it.' 40 Regarding the international norm against torture,
however, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has been shy about its
domestic application.
The First Congress passed the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") as part of the
Judiciary Act of 1789.141 The ATS is a one sentence pronouncement that gives
federal district courts "original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.' 42 The sentence's meaning had been vociferously debated by scholars
and courts, but was conclusively decided by the Supreme Court in Sosa vAlvarez Machain: ATS is purely jurisdictional and does not substantively convert
international law into new domestic causes of action.'43 The Court further held
that ATS only permits suits based on a small subset of modern-day customary
international law, specifically "norm[s] of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms we have recognized.' 44 The customary international
norm against torture is implicitly included in this answer; aliens can sue in federal
court for injuries caused by official acts of torture.
The international norm against torture, as shown in Section II.A.1, has
been repeatedly recognized in domestic US law. In dicta, the Sosa Court stated
that the anti-torture norm is sufficiently specific and established to allow aliens
to sue under ATS."' While other areas of customary international law may not
138 Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L Rev at 320-21 (cited in note 99).
139

See Sosa, 542 US at 723-25.
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See Third Restatement § 115(1)(a) (cited in note 81).
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The act has been modified since its initial passage and is now codified at 28 USC § 1350 (2000).
Courts and scholars have referred to this law both as the Alien Tort Statute and as the Alien Tort
Claims Act.
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Id.
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542 US at 714.
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Idat725.
Id at 728 (noting a clear, affirmative congressional mandate that "the Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991, 106 Stat 73 [Pub L No 102-256] provid[es] authority that establish[es] an
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fall under ATS's rubric, the norm against torture does and aliens may sue US
officials to vindicate it.
Some might caution against this reading. Indeed, despite The Paquete
Habana's claim that "[i]nternational law is part of our law,' 1' 46 courts have been
reluctant to allow domestic suits based on international customs that lack
affirmative domestic integration. 147 Further, if one can enforce the customary
international right against torture under ATS, perhaps domestic courts would
slide down
the notorious "slippery slope" and allow other international causes of
48
action.

1

A thorough examination of Sosa mutes both of these concerns. Although
Congress has not incorporated customary international law wholesale, the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 established a "clear mandate" for "an
unambiguous and modern basis for federal claims of torture and extrajudicial
killing.' ' 149 The international norm against torture has Congress's imprimatur;
ATS torture suits will not rest on empty judicial fiat.
Sosa also clearly limits the substantive domestic reach of customary
international law. Torture's "affirmative authority is confined to [that] specific
subject matter" and courts have "no congressional mandate to seek out and
define new and debatable violations of the law of nations" nor should they
undertake "greater judicial creativity.' i The customary international law of
torture has been solidly established, clearly delineated, and affirmatively
incorporated into domestic law. Torture litigation will be a "sticky staircase"-it
will not create a slippery slope because courts have been explicty instructed not
to venture beyond this specific international norm.
While the customary international law of torture and ATS do not bind the
United States in a strict sense-the United States still has the ability, as a factual
matter, to torture-it does bind the United States by imposing costs and
disinclining behavior. This binding force is the same for individuals under
domestic law. Persons have the ability to murder and steal, but they are bound to
pay the costs imposed by criminal law.
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unambiguous and modern basis for federal claims of torture and extrajudicial killing") (internal
quotations omitted).
The PaqueteHabana, 175 US at 700.
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III. SHOULD THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
TORTURE BIND THE UNITED STATES?

This Comment has shown that there is a compulsory customary
international law against torture, that this norm binds the United States, and that
the United States violated it by torturing War on Terror detainees. This Section
steps back to a higher level of abstraction, asking whether the United States
should be bound by the customary international law against torture. I conclude
that the anti-torture norm's binding power is good policy and that ATS litigation
is a good method to apply this norm to the United States.
I will not consider moral arguments in this Section. Morality is usually
debated at the level of first principles, where arguments aim to convince one to
agree or disagree with a moral axiom; moral debates rarely reduce to nuanced,
fine-grained analysis. Also, there are good reasons to suggest that states comply
with international law for instrumental and not moral reasons;"' a moral analysis
might not engage the true motives animating state behavior. This Section will
focus on the instrumental reasons because they implicate policy and permit
nuanced analysis and debate.
ATS litigation, the current method by which the customary international
norm against torture binds the United States, yields tort damages to successful
plaintiffs. These damages, paid by guilty official torturers, are crucial to
establishing an "efficient" level of torture, an equilibrium that may rest at some
or no incidences of abuse.
A. WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT TORTURE

There are powerful reasons for the United States not to torture. Central
among them are: torture is antithetical to the American ideal and rhetoric;" 2
torture seems to be, at best, only moderately effective at producing good
intelligence;" 3 and US torture risks that Americans abroad will be tortured
4

themselves.'1
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See Eric A. Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obligalion to Obey InternationalLaw?, 55 Stan L Rev 1901
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(2003); Goldsmith and Posner, 66 U Chi L Rev at 1115 (cited in note 85).
But see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 25-27 (Norton 2001) (noting a

153

historic disconnect between US realpolitik foreign policy and its liberal rhetoric).
See Bald e-mail (noting that Guantanamo's torture techniques "have produced no intelligence of a
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threat neutralization nature to date") (cited in note 35).
Pamela Hess, Rum /eld Sued in Detainee Torture Case, UPI (Mar 1, 2005) (noting the concern of Rear
Admiral John Hutson, a former Navy Judge Advocate General, that "[iln the future, our troops
may not be the captors but the captives').
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There are less obvious reasons as well. US officials, in addition to
American servicemen and travelers, also incur risks from US torture. In
December 2004, a German federal prosecutor began investigating charges
against high-ranking US officials, including Secretary Rumsfeld, Undersecretary
of Defense for Intelligence Stephen A. Cambone, and former Director of
Central Intelligence George Tenet.15 Though the German prosecutor declined
to pursue the case, l16 this example highlights the collateral effects of torture.
Justice Breyer noted that torture is one of the few international norms with such
universal agreement that "every nation's courts" has the power to "adjudicate
foreign conduct involving foreign parties." ' It is possible that Germany's
investigation of US conduct foreshadows the future. Even if US officials are
never actually tried overseas, a lack of American legal process to check torture
makes certain that the United States will bear the costs of opposing these trials
and their concomitant risks.
A second collateral effect of US torture is that it undercuts the power of
customary international law. If followed by other states, the US policy of
disregarding international norms could undermine the international system. Just
as individuals interact within the shadow of domestic law, 5 8 states order their
relationships and treaties against the background of customary international law.
This is especially true in international humanitarian law. Treaty-based
humanitarian law, such as the Geneva Conventions, "does not... regulate a
large proportion of today's armed conflicts in sufficient detail."'5 9 This underregulation is because "the bulk of current armed conflicts are non-international
and such conflicts are subject to far fewer treaty rules than international ones." 60
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White and Mintz, Red Cross Cites 'Inhumane" Treatment, Wash Post at A10 (cited in note 27); CCR
Seeks Criminal Investigation in Germany of U.S. Officialsfor War Crimes in Abu Ghraib Torture, available
online at <http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/report.asp?ObjID=TCRIT9TuSb&Content=471>
(visited Oct 25, 2005). The other charged officials are Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Major
General Walter Wojdakowski, Major General Geoffrey Miller, Brigadier General Janis L.
Karpinski, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry L. Phillabaum, Colonel Thomas Pappas, and Lieutenant
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Docket: Centerfor ConstitutionalRights Seeks CriminalInvestigation in Germany of U.S. Officials in Abu
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Customary international law "fill[s] this gap in providing rules that are applicable
to all armed conflicts, irrespective of their intensity.' 161 US torture, then, could
unintentionally weaken or eliminate these background legal checks.
The War on Terror seeks more than the simple neutralization of its
enemies; the United States is seeking to win the hearts and minds of its would-be
adversaries. To do this, the United States must not just win battles, but
"preserve[ U.S. credibility and moral authority by taking the high ground"'162 to
win international support and dissuade nascent terrorists from taking up arms
against America. Even if torture yielded tactical advantages-and it is not clear
that it does-these short-term gains are outweighed by the long-term damage to
US strategy. Fyodor Dostoyevsky was rumored to have said that "[t]he degree of
civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons.' 6 3 Nothing
undercuts the image of American freedom and tolerance more than the brutal,
graphic torture of then-defenseless detainees.
B. WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONSIDER TORTURE
The strongest reason why the United States should torture detainees is
because torture provides useful intelligence that cannot be accessed via kinder
interrogation methods. While the truth of this theory has been supported by
some164 and rebutted by others,' 65 it is clear that military necessity does not
conclusively warrant or justify torture.
The next best reason to torture is, ironically, to ensure that international
humanitarian law is obeyed. John C. Yoo notes that "effective enforcement of
international law, including the laws of war, requires the existence of incentives
for compliance and disincentives for noncompliance.' ' 67 Al Qaeda and the
Taliban do not observe the laws of war and the United States has not been able
to successfully incentivize their compliance.'68 Perhaps American torture might

161
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Id.
Memorandum from Colin L. Powel, Secretary of State, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Draft Decision Memorandum
for the Presidenton the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan 3 Uan 26, 2002)
(on file with author).
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See Mac Donald, 15 City J at 28 (cited in note 42). See also Section I.D.2.b.
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But, as noted in Section II.C, this reason could still be considered by policymakers.

167

Yoo, 3 Chinese J Ind L at 137 (cited in note 7).
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See Gonzales Draft Memorandum at 3 (noting that US compliance with the laws of war has not
prompted "our adversaries in several recent conflicts" to reciprocate) (cited in note 69).
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be enough of a disincentive to force them back into harmony with the laws of
war.
This argument echoes the rationale behind the 1968 US bombing of
Bentre, Vietnam: "It became necessary to destroy the town to save it.' 169 While
it is possible that US torture-which is itself a violation of international lawcould yield eventual compliance with humanitarian law, this policy does not
evince respect for the spirit or substance of international law.
C. ATS LITIGATION YIELDS AN EFFICIENT OUTCOME
Multiple considerations should influence the decision to torture. Perhaps
policymakers would agree with Professor Yoo's incentive thesis or perhaps they
would agree with Henckaerts's belief about the importance of background
humanitarian norms. Under the current calculus, however, it is unlikely that the
wartime torturer considers any of these higher order concerns; the perceived
short-term tactical gains of torture are likely considered to the exclusion of any
collateral effects. ATS litigation based on the customary norm against torture is
one way to ensure that this skewed reasoning does not happen.
All rational decisions, including the decision to torture, are products of
cost-benefit analyses that force an entity to allocate its finite resources to
maximize its goals. Law is based on this calculus: one obeys the law if the
law if the
benefits of obedience outweigh the costs. Similarly, one breaks 7the
0
disobedience.1
of
benefits
the
than
less
costs of noncompliance are
Humans, however, often use intellectual shortcuts instead of exhaustive
cost-benefit analyses. 171 The War on Terror's torture decision is victim to this
bounded rationality. If torturers were to face liability under ATS, they would
have powerful incentives to rationally analyze the torture policy and thereby
internalize torture's externalities; the concern of possible litigation sharpens the
payments motivates one to consider-and
mind and the threat of damage
172
behavior.
perhaps alter-one's
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This is true even if the policymakers do not face personal liability. The directly liable torturers
could be indemnified by the United States, thereby transmitting the incentives up the chain of
command.
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Torture has consequences that are hard to conceive and difficult to
quantify. What benefit does the United States derive from torturing a detainee?
What is the cost of undercutting the background norms of international
humanitarian law? How much is it worth to avoid exposing US officials to
foreign liability? ATS suits will force policymakers to reach these conclusions
without foreclosing policy options.
This plan only imposes procedural restrictions, not substantive ones. US
policy can remain adaptive-a definite asset for the War on Terror's
prosecution. ATS litigation forces the internalization of torture's externalities,
both positive and negative because potential liability prompts rationality. If the
United States persists in torturing, the torture will be the product of reasoned
analysis and because its harms are presumably outweighed by its general
benefits.'73
One objection to this approach is that liability will make policymakers
overly reluctant to torture, even if its gains are greater than its harms. This may
be true on the margins, but this objection is targeted not at this Comment's
thesis but at its implementation. Similarly, if this concern is valid, it can be
remedied by altering the size and gradation of damage awards. Fine-tuning
damage awards will minimize the odds that the officials would choose an
incorrect policy.
Another possible concern is that torture litigation under ATS would
weaken torture's moral opprobrium and thereby lead to an increase of abuse.
Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner have shown that paying fines for
forbidden acts-such as paying damages for torture-can legitimize and increase
the underlying conduct.' ATS's incorporation of customary international law
might make torture just another cost of waging war. Indeed, that is exactly what
will happen if torture is subject to dispassionate cost-benefit scrutiny. This is a
valid concern, but it must be balanced against the status quo. Torture is currently
considered to be morally wrong, yet it was routinely and systematically inflicted
by US agents. The moral opprobrium is not doing much to limit acts of torture.
Lawsuits, however, would force torture's benefits and costs into policymakers'
consciousness. Hoping for the elimination of torture may be a utopian dream;
hoping for its efficient and sparing use is a realistic one.
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